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RETURN TO EUROPE: Integrating Eastern European Economies
into the European Market Through Alliance with the European
Community
As of April 1990, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and
Bulgaria had negotiated bilateral trade accords with the European
Community (EC). I By mid-summer, these accords are expected to give
rise to more formal association agreements that will provide stronger
and more permanent economic ties between the EC and East Europe.
2
EC association will assist these five states in transforming their com-
mand economies into market structures by extending the trade liber-
alization begun by the accords, encouraging systemic change, and
providing for political dialogue.
In seeking Western economic alliance, the five East European states
could have pursued their economic transformation along at least three
different diplomatic paths. 3 As a group, they might have negotiated
integration into the European market on a multilateral basis, perhaps
revamping their existing trade association, the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (Comecon). 4 Alternately, individual East Euro-
1. This Recent Development does not consider East Germany, Romania, or the Soviet Union.
East Germany has already begun the process of reunification with West Germany and presents
a unique situation. The turbulence of the Romanian situation interrupted diplomatic relations
with the EC and delayed any agreement. The Soviet Union, although it has been attentive to
the processes of East European integration and recently signed an accord with the EC, is simply
too large and powerful for unfettered entry into the European market. We refer to the five states
considered as "East Europe." Questions of nomenclature and identity are considered in depth in
Eastern Europe... Central Europe... Europe, 119 DAEDALUS-J. AM. ACADEMY ARTS & Sa.
(1990).
The European Economic Community was established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. It is
currently composed of twelve states: Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. See
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11; se
also Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
169; Treaty Instituting the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S.
143.
2. LaFranchi, Events in Eastern Europe Force EC to Consider Stronger Executive, Christ. Sci. Mon.,
Mar. 9, 1990 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file); Auerbach, EC Seeks to Improve Ties With Eastern
Europe: Continent Wide Free Trade Zone May Be Goal, Wash. Post, Feb. 24, 1990 (LEXIS, Nexis
library, Omni file).
3. We do not discuss a fourth possible model, bilateral negotiations between individual
states, because such negotiations have played a relatively minor role. Where such negotiations
have existed, for example Romania and Spain, the agreements are intended to be a step toward
closer association with the EC. Romanian Prime Minister Asks for Help From Spain, UPI, Apr. 17,
1990 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file).
4. Created by Stalin in 1949, Comecon was designed to coordinate economic relations between
the planned economies and has "always been hopelessly inefficient." Comecon: An Idea Whose Time
Is Gone, ECONOMIsT, Jan. 13, 1990, at 46. With the Joint Declaration of June 22, 1988,
Comecon and the EC first recognized each other. 31 O.J. EuR. CoMmI. (No. L 157) 34 (1988)..
Nevertheless, Comecon has played a relatively minor role in the economic integeration of East
Europe and many members now seek reforms to reflect their new beliefs about the conduct of
economic and political life.
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pean states might have concentrated on bilateral arrangements with
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).5 Instead, they have
chosen separate, but virtually identical, bilateral negotiations with the
EC as the surest path to economic stability. The choice of bilateral
agreements with the EC and the similarity of the accords negotiated
have powerful implications for the future East Europe.
Multilateral models of East European economic integration into the
European market involve three discrete blocs: the EC, EFTA, and East
Europe. European planners arrange these blocs in several ways. For
example, EC Commission President Jacques Delors promotes a con-
centric model of Europe with a highly integrated EC at the center,
surrounded by a less integrated free trade ring including the EFTA
states, with the East European states on the periphery.6 Soviet Foreign
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze rejects the hierarchy and Western focus
of the concentric model and envisions the three blocs at the corners
of a triangle.7 Both models may overstate the potential relationship
between the East European and EFTA blocs; a strong central EC
orbited by separate EFTA and East European blocs might better
describe the growing centrality of the EC in the European economy.
The recent bilateral agreements reached by five East European states,
however, cannot be understood within the confines of a model of
Europe as a configuration of blocs. Blocs imply relatively established
patterns of diplomatic association, an inadequate way of understanding
contemporary European dynamism. The increasing integration of the
EC, accelerated by the Single European Act, has resulted in some
factionalization of the Community.8 In addition, the prospect of the
5. EFTA is currently composed of Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzer-
land. It was established in 1960 as a free trade zone. Founded as an alternative to the EC, EFTA
allows Member States full retention of their decision-making powers. Convention Establishing
the European Free Trade Association, Jan. 4, 1960, 370 U.N.T.S. 3.
6. See Muehring, Europe's New Order, INST. INVESTOR, Dec. 1989 (LEXIS, Nexis library,
Omni file). In a concentric model, also known as a model of "variable geometry," states in all
circles trade with one another. But this model assumes that few states will change circles. The
EC's freeze on new membership until after 1992 might support that vision of stability. Austria,
Turkey, and Malta have had applications postponed. EFTA, too, has shown little eagerness to
extend membership to developing East European states. EFTA's position may be a product of
its admission system, which requires a unanimous vote to induct new members, effectively
giving each stare a veto power. Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Association,
Jan. 4, 1960, arts. 32, 41, 370 U.N.T.S. 3.
7. Wash. Post, Dec. 19, 1989 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file).
8. Single European Act, 30 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No. L 169) 1, art. 13 (1987). Since its
foundation, the EC has become increasingly integrated. This process is controversial. EC Com-
mission President Jacques Delors advocates a federal system similar to the United States while
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher urges a future EC in which Member States would
retain a great deal of autonomy, but enjoy an absolutely free internal market. See generally
Muehring, supra note 6. Both visions imply a great change from the present situation in Europe.
See generally Krugman, EFTA and 1992 (EFTA Occasional Paper No. 23, June 1988).
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removal of all trade barriers among EC states has led EFTA to
strengthen ties with the EC. 9
A description of East Europe as a bloc also ignores the deep differ-
ences among the East European states. The pervasive influence of the
Soviets and the dramatic transformations of 1989 have obscured the
underlying diversity among East European states. Yugoslavia, for
instance, has been trying to move toward capitalism for over a decade.
In contrast, Czechoslovakia only began real efforts at reform in No-
vember 1989. Currently run by a hurriedly formed coalition of stu-
dents, intellectuals, and others under the charismatic leadership of
president and playwright Vaclev Havel, Czechoslovakia is preparing
for elections in June. 10 Poland is different still. As it enters its second
decade, Solidarity represents a level of political experience, organiza-
tion, and cohesion not generally found in the new East European
governments: 1 As a result of this diversity, the five East European
states differ in both their present stages of development as well as
their degree of commitment to and understanding of the changes they
want. 12
The extent of present macroeconomic disequilibrium also differen-
tiates the five East European states. The lack of market structures,
such as pricing and currency convertibility, makes the accurate com-
parison of East European economies very difficult. Nevertheless, some
differences are apparent. The debt burdens of individual states vary,
with the $40 billion Polish debt roughly twice that of any other
9. In reaction to the process of integration, the EFTA states must move closer to the EC to
avoid substantial damage to their own economies. EFTA fears that the removal of all trade
barriers among EC states will result in defacto tariffs on products from outside the EC, including
EFTA products. See generally Wallace & Wessels, Towards a New Partnership: The EC and EFTA
in the Wider Western Europe (EFTA Occasional Paper No. 28, Mar. 1989); iee also Krugman, supra
note 8. Since the EFIA states depend on trade with the EC, they are currently negotiating for
a European Economic Space (EES), which would guarantee continued free trade with the EC.
Such a "structured partnership," EFTA Ministers Conclude Meeting and Call for a "Structured
Partnership" With the EC, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) at 1629 (Dec. 13, 1989), would "assure
the free circulation of goods, people, services and capital between the two blocs." EC, EFTA
Foreign Ministers Agree to Launch Negotiations on Closer Economic Integration, 7 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA), at 22 (Jan. 3, 1990).
10. See Ash, The Revolution of the Magic Lantern, N.Y. Rev. Books, Jan. 18, 1990, at 42.
11. Despite rumors of the splintering of Solidarity, and Solidarity leader Lech Walesa's recent
flirtation with presidential candidacy (a: direct challenge to General Jaruzelski), Solidarity con-
tinues to be the strongest political force in Poland. N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1990, at A4, col. 1;
N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1990, at 1, col. 6. Contra Solidarity: A Good Thing While It Lasted,
ECONOMIST, Mar. 24, 1990, at 53 (describing increasing differences between Solidarity leader
Lech Walesa and Solidarity Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki).
12. S. Fischer, Address at the Conference on Economic Transition in Eastern Europe, Brandeis
University (May 4, 1990) (available from Brandeis University) (Dr. Fischer is Vice President for
Economics at the World Bank).
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state. 13 In addition, some states are experiencing severe inflationary
crises while others, at least in relative terms, have managed to escape
the crippling effects of currency devaluation. For example, Yugoslavia
has adopted severe austerity measures in order to bring hyperinflation
under control. 14 Hungary, on the other hand, averages a mere fifteen
to twenty percent annual inflation rate.' 5 Openness to foreign invest-
ment also differentiates the states. Hungary has the most advantageous
foreign investment laws, allowing 100% foreign ownership and a five
year tax holiday for joint ventures in select industries. 16
Even the common need for Western aid separates the East European
states from one another. Because reconstruction and the creation :of
market economies requires extensive financial support, states must vie
for limited Western assistance.' 7 Recently, the President of the Hun-
garian National Bank, Ferenc Bartha, requested aid with the preface,
"We are not Poland.""' Czechoslovakia sees a break with its former
Comecon trading partners as an important step toward establishing
functioning market economies while Hungary's relationship with Co-
mecon remains uncertain. 19 The many differences between the five
13. Androsch, Go Long on Poland, 4 INT'L EcoN. 30. The Paris Club has agreed to suspend
payments on $9.4 billion of Poland's current debt and to give Poland financial assistance to
begin restructuring. Rich Nations Give Hope to East Bloc Aid-Seebers, Reuters, Feb. 16, 1990
(LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file). But although the Polish debt is the largest in absolute terms,
it is less than Hungary's debt on a per capita basis and approximately equal to Hungary's debt
in terms of GNP. Hungary, which has not rescheduled its loan payments, is considered to be
in the best shape of the five East European states in terms of foreign debt. S. Wellisz Address
at Conference on Economic Transition in Eastern Europe, Brandeis University (May 4, 1990)
(available from Brandeis University).
14. "Bankruptcy procedures are under way at 122 firms as a result of the reforms. Yugoslav
economists have predicted that mass factory closures will lay off 1.2 million people, or about
one-fifth of all workers, doubling the unemployment rate." Heritage, Yugoslavia has Problems
Making Capitalists Out of Communists, Reuters, Mar. 16, 1990 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file).
15. Parker, Eastern Europe's Insiders Outline Their Strategies, 4 INT'L ECON. 35, 36.
16. Cowboy Capitalism Goes East, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., Jan. 22, 1990, at 34.
17. The allocation of foreign capital presents problems of horizontal equity, as Western
lenders have yet to develop an organized set of performance criteria for aid. C. Cooper, Address
at the Conference on Economic Transition in Eastern Europe, Brandeis University (May 4, 1990)
(available from Brandeis University) (Dr. Cooper is former Executive Director of the World
Bank.).
18. Parker, supra note 15, at 36. Bartha distinguished Hungary from Poland in terms of
debt burden, infrastructure, market equilibrium, and agricultural and, industrial production.
19. Czechoslovakia has officially notified Comecon that it will withdraw from three multi-
lateral agreements designed to regulate currency rates in trade relations. Peel & Buchan, Prague
Quits Comecon Agreements, Fin. Times, Apr. 5, 1990 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file). In January
1990, Hungary suspended its ruble-denominated exports to the Soviet-led bloc in order to
control inflation resulting from the drain of goods from the country. Nevertheless, Hungary
continues to value its Eastern trade ties and seems unlikely to secede from Comecon. Hungary
Sees Gains in Comecon Trade Ties, Deputy Minister Says, Reuters, Jan. 26, 1990 (LEXIS, Nexis
library, Omni file). Indeed, not all East European states plan to leave Comecon behind. Polish
economist Wirold Trzeciakowski points our that the Soviet Union still supplies two-thirds of
Polish raw materials and a great deal of their machinery, in addition to being a major creditor.
Consequently, at least in Poland's case, withdrawal from Comecon is unlikely. Parker, supra note
15, at 37.
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East European states led to bilateral trade agreements with the EC
rather than a more integrated multilateral approach.
In seeking bilateral arrangements as a wedge into Western markets,
several East European states considered but decided not to emphasize
trade agreements with EFTA. 20 EFTA has a loose, decentralized struc-
ture that could accommodate the differences among East European
states, particularly the different rates at which they create functional
markets. The East European states have an abundance of skilled labor
and are short of capital. The EFTA states, in contrast, are capital rich
and have high labor costs. At least in principle, these complementary
advantages could foster close economic cooperation.
Political and security considerations might also induce East Euro-
pean states to negotiate primarily with EFTA. At this time, the East
European states remain in the Warsaw Pact. Because the EC is devel-
oping a foreign policy and is dominated by NATO states, an infusion
of Warsaw Pact states might pose a problem for both European and
Soviet security. 21 Unlike the EC, joining EFTA entails no political
commitments .22
Perhaps encouraged by these structural and political considerations,
several East European states entered negotiations with EFTA. Yugo-
slavia has long cooperated with EFTA and recently expressed interest
in membership. 23 Hungary has agreed in principle to seek a relation-
ship with EFTA similar to that currently enjoyed by Yugoslavia. 24
Poland has filed a draft declaration of cooperation with EFTA. 25
Despite their theoretical appeal, strong trade agreements between
EFTA and individual East European states have not been pursued.
Most East European states regard alliance with EFTA as a supplement
to negotiation with the EC. 26 For example, Yugoslavia sees EFTA
20. "EFTA is in a special position to provide Eastern Europe with an economic, though not
necessarily a political, opening to Western Europe: EFTA's per capita trade with Eastern Europe
is three times that of the EC's." Wallace, Europe's Economic Groups to Meet, Christ. Sci. Mon.,
Dec. 18, 1989 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file).
21. Rashish, A Club for East Europe to Join, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1990, at 21, col. 1.
22. EFTA was in large degree founded to provide the economic benefits of free trade without
undue interference in matters of national policy. In contrast, one of the principal architects of
the EC wrote, "There will be no peace in Europe if States are reconstituted on a basis of national
sovereignty with all that that implies in terms of prestige politics and economic protectionism."
P. FONTAINE, JEAN MONNET, A GRAND DESIGN FOR EUROPE 41 (1988).
23. Pisar, Yugoslavia and Europe, 41 REV. INT'L AFF. 27 (1990).
24. EFTA Working on Joint Declaration of Cooperation With Hungary, Reuters, Mar. 9, 1990
(LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file).
25. Jaruzelski Appeals for Reduction In Poland's Debt, Reuters, Feb. 4, 1990.
26. "Regarding our relations with Europe, we are candidates for entering the European
Community. . . .We are striving to enter EFTA and we understand that EEC will become a
new home for European countries which will perform well . . . .But our ambition is to get
the membership of the European Community." Statement of Zivko Pregl, Deputy Prime Minister
of Yugoslavia (available from the Yugoslavian Embassy to the U.S.).
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membership as a stepping stone to the EC. And EFTA itself may be
unsuited to accepting the East European states as members. EFTA
comprises highly independent trading states and has little corporate
identity. Although it has a central administrative structure, with a
council which meets periodically, EFTA is not oriented toward con-
certed action. 27 With the exception of agreements with the EC, EFTA
states seldom adopt a common policy toward non-EFTA states. As a
result, EFTA and the five East European states have not formed long-
term agreements with each other.
The hesitancy of East European-EFTA negotiations also reflects the
East European emphasis on bilateral association with the EC. In their
Joint Declaration of June 22, 1988, Comecon and the EC first autho-
rized bilateral negotiations between East European states and the EC.28
Since then, all five states have made substantial progress toward nor-
malizing relations with the EC. Hungary signed an accord on Septem-
ber 26, 1988, while still under the old regime. 29 Czechoslovakia
signed an agreement on December 16, 1988, which it upgraded on
March 23, 1990.30 Poland signed an accord on March 13, 1990, and
Bulgaria and the EC initialled a pact to liberalize trade on April 3,
1990.31 Yugoslavia signed a basic trade and economic cooperation
agreement with the EC in 1983. This agreement has been steadily
amended and is now functionally on par with the other, more recent,
East European accords. 32 These similar, individual accords satisfy the
East European preference for bilateral negotiation but, in practical
terms, may group the five East European states together.
Although formally bilateral, the individual accords are remarkably
similar in scope, language, and structure. 33 Their central concern is
27. Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Zone, Jan. 4, 1960 art. 32, 370
U.N.T.S. 3. On EFTA's lack of consensus, see EFTA Ministers Conclude Meeting with Call for a
"Structured Partnership" with the EC, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) at 1629 (Dec. 13, 1989).
28. 31 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 157) 34 (1988).
29. 31 O.J. EUR. Comm.!. (No. L 327) 1 (1988).
30. 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 88) 1 (1989). A revised agreement, as yet unpublished,
was initialed on March 23, 1990, and is reported to give Czechoslovakia better access to EC
markets and "know how" as one of a "series of pacts being concluded with reforming East Bloc
countries at a breathtaking pace." EC, Czechoslovakia Initial Sweeping Trade and Cooperation Pact,
Reuters, March 23, 1990 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file).
31. 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 339) 1 (1989) (Poland). Bulgaria initialed an accord, not
yet published, which marked the final agreement in the series. EC, Bulgaria Initial 10-Year
Trade, Cooperation Pact, Reuters, Apr. 4, 1990 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni File).
32. For the basic accord, see 26 O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. L 41) 1 (1983). Subsequent
amendments and supplements are found in 32 O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. L 307) 5 (1989); 31
O.J. EUR. Comms. (No. L 367) 78 (1988); 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 389) 65 (1987); 30
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 371) 4 (1987); 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 318) 51 (1987); 28
O.J. EUR. COm. (No. L 288) 4 (1985); 26 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 237) 1 (1983).
33. 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 339) 1 (1989) (Poland); 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 88)
1 (1989) (Czechoslovakia); 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 327) 1 (1988) (Hungary). Bulgaria's
accord is not yet published. Due to its history, Yugoslavia's accord is something of a special
case.
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normalization of trade in industrial products. The accords do not apply
to products covered by the treaty establishing the European Coal and
Steel Community, affect the provisions of existing agreements con-
cerning trade in textile products, or disturb existing agreements in
the agricultural sector.34 The parties attempt to liberalize trade in
industrial products by pledging to "accord the highest degree of
liberalization which they generally apply to third countries to imports
of the other's products." 35 All the accords abolish specific quantitative
restrictions on EC imports and promote cooperation in a variety of
areas, including industry, energy, mining, tourism, and the protection
of the environment. 36 The accords all establish a committee to monitor
and amend the processes of trade liberalization and economic cooper-
ation. 37 Agreements concerning specific products are contained in
appended annexes.
The Yugoslavian accords differ slightly from the others. Never
bound by the strictures of Comecon membership, Yugoslavia has a
longer history of economic reform, and of negotiating with the EC,
than the other East European states.38 In general, the Yugoslavian
accord is less oriented toward the creation and liberalization of markets
and more oriented toward "contributing to the economic and social
34. 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 339) tit. I, art. 4, at 3 (1989) (Poland) (parties agree not
to disturb existing or subsequent agricultural agreements); 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 327)
tit. I, art. 3, at 3 (1988) (Hungary) (parties agree not to disturb existing or subsequent
agricultural agreements). But see 32 O.J. EuR. COMM. (NO. L 339) tit. I, art. 12, at 4 (1989)
(Poland) (handling agricultural matters). The agreement with Czechoslovakia makes no explicit
mention of agricultural agreements. In general, the Czechoslovakian accord is less comprehensive
than the other East European accords. Presumably, the updated accord initialed (not yet pub-
lished) on March 23, 1990, makes the Czech accord equivalent to those of Poland and Hungary.
35. 32 O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. L 339) tit. I, art. 6, at 3 (1989) (Poland); 32 O.J. Eur.
Comm. (No. L 88) art. 3, at 3 (1989) (Czechoslovakia) (which reads "highest possible degree
of liberalization"); 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 327) tit. I, art. 4, at 3 (1988) (Hungary).
36. Accords between Poland and Hungary and the EC are also similar in their modifications
under the Poland Hungary Aid for Restructuring of Economies (PHARE) action plan, formed
by the Group of Seven at the Paris Summit (July 14-16, 1989) and subsequently adopted by
the Group of 24. Under PHARE, the EC is responsible for coordination of the aid which the
Group of 24 is extending to Poland and Hungary. Although the EC will not supervise the debt
problems of Poland and Hungary, the EC budget will guarantee billions of ECU in loans for
restructuring. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EC-EASTERN EUROPEAN RE-
LATIONS: BACKGROUND BIEF (Jan. 19, 1990).
37. 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 339) tit. III, art. 20, at 6 (1989) (Poland); 32 O.J. EUR.
Comm. (No. L 88) art. 12, at 4 (1989) (Czechoslovakia); 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 327)
tit. III, art. 13, at 5 (1988) (Hungary).
38. Paradoxically, Yugoslavia seems to see itself as both ahead of and behind the events
elsewhere in East Europe. "It should not be forgotten that by her resistance to Stalinism, by
her option for socialism with a "humane image," by her open frontiers and circulation of her
citizens among the manpower of European states, Yugoslavia was a direct participant in creating
a new kind of Europe. If her institutional association with Europe objectively lags somewhat
today, the fault is not Yugoslavia's alone." Pisar, Yugoslavia and Europe, 41 REV. INT'L AFF.
25, 26 (1990).
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development of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." 39 Never-
theless, the Yugoslavian accord resembles the other accords in many
respects. 40 Most importantly, ,the current enthusiasm for market reform
makes the accord functionally similar to the accords signed between
the EC and the Comecon states.4 1
By mid-summer, these accords should lead to a "second generation"
of bilateral association agreements, which were approved at the EC
Summit in Dublin on April 28, 1990.42 The associations will be
relatively novel because, unlike the earlier associations enjoyed by
Greece, Portugal, and Spain, they will not provide for future accession
into the EC. 43 The associations thereby strike a compromise by an-
choring the five East European states while avoiding rash commitment
by an EC that remains somewhat undecided about its own scope.
44
The association agreements will accelerate the process of trade liber-
alization begun by the accords, but no schedule has been set for the
39. 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 41) art. 1, at 4 (1983). The main difference between the
Yugoslavian accord and the others is one of tone: Where the more recent accords confess a belief
in the free market, the Yugoslavian accord seeks to improve "the conditions of access for Yugoslav
products into the Community marker." Id. tit. II, art. 14, at 6.
40. Under article 15 and subject to various restrictions, Yugoslavia may export industrial
products to the EC free of numerical quotas or customs duties. 26 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No. L
41) tit. II, art. 15, at 6 (1983). But see 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 307) 5 (1989) (reestablishing
some customs duties as provided by article 15). The Yugoslavian accord also provides for a
"cooperation council," analagous to the Joint Committee of the other accords. 26 O.J. FUR.
COMM. (No. L 41) tit. III, arts. 46-51, at 12-13. But in contrast to the other accords, the
Yugoslavian accord is longer and broader in scope; it treats labor, prior agreements with Italy,
and a wide range of agricultural products. Id. tit. IV, arts. 44-47, at 12-13 (labor); tit. III,
arts. 41-43, at 12 (prior agreements with Italy); tit. I, art. 7, at 5 (agriculture).
41. "What is essential is that Yugoslavia is definitely coming out of a prolonged period of
stagnation; a period in which, if I may say so, a certain neodogmatism prevailed . . . .The
Yugoslav Government has introduced a programme of economic reform, based on the laws of a
modern market economy." Loncar, Yugoslavia and the World, 41 Rev. INT'L As. 1, 5 (1990)
(speech delivered by Yugoslavian Secretary for Foreign Affairs Budimir Loncar at the French
Foreign Relations Institute, Paris, Jan. 31, 1990).
42. Goldsmith, European Leaders Take Crucial Step Toward "Political Union", UPI, Apr. 28,
1990 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file). Approval for association extends to Poland, Hungary,
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania.
43. Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Romania seek to join the
EC as soon as possible, but the new-style association pacts carry no guarantee of eventual
membership, unlike previous agreements that led to Greece, Spain, and Portugal joining the
Community in the 1980's. Id.
44. European Community: Deepeners versus Wideners, ECONOMIST, Feb. 3, 1990, at 50. Too
strong a commitment to East Europe may upset the process of EC integration. The Single Act
came into force in 1987; the momentum behind the integration process is not very old. The
Bundesbank has already committed many resources to the process of German unification and
may be unable to steady the financial course of an EC heavily committed to East Europe. Despite
recent successes, the EC is hardly uncontroversial and if participation in the market leads in the
short term to inflation or other hardship, it will be politically difficult to sustain the process of
integration. The EC may assume many of the burdens of transforming the East, but it must
spend political, as well as financial, capital to do so. See Hoffman, A Plan for The New Europe,
N.Y. Rev. Books, Jan. 18, 1990, at 18.
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achievement of free trade. The associations will also encourage systemic
change in the East European states by requiring progress "towards
systems based on political and economic liberties." 45 The association
agreements will include "technical assistance and financial support"
and "information exchange and cooperation. '"46 Joint projects will be
created for the renovation and construction of the infrastructure nec-
essary to a modern economy. Finally, association agreements will
provide for political dialogue between the Community and the several
East European states. 47 In sum, EC association substantially institu-
tionalizes, and thereby solidifies, the changes wrought by the recent
upheavals in East Europe.
Association agreements benefit both the EC and the five East Eu-
ropean states. The East European states must find markets to replace
the guarantees afforded by the Comecon system; association would
promote entry into the markets of Western Europe. Industrialized free
market societies rely on stable markets to insure the delivery of basic
goods and services. The danger of gradual change in the East European
states, however, is that government may be unable to administer an
area of the economy, while the private sector may not be developed
enough to meet the societal need dependent on that area of the
economy. Also, the transition to a market economy will result in
inflation as price restraints are lifted on scarce goods. Because inflation
coupled with unemployment will inevitably create social discontent,
many East European states seek rapid transformation. 4 Bilateral as-
sociation with the EC, with accompanying aid, technology, and access
to Western markets, will speed these transformations and thereby
cushion some of the inevitable hardships of structural change.
In addition to positive benefits, EC association will also avoid the
potential economic disadvantage that further EC integration will create
for the five East European states. Unassociated, the East European
45. Currently, the G-24 provision of similar support, which is coordinated by the EC, is
premised on the progressive adoption of liberal values and market economics. Presumably the
EC will continue this policy. Andriessen, Change in Central and Eastern Europe: The Role of the
European Community, NATO RaV., Feb. 1990, at 1, 4. (Frans H.J.J. Andriessen is Commissioner
for External Relations and Trade Policy for the European Community.).
46. Id. at 6.
47. Id.
48. "You don't try to cross a chasm in two jumps." Sachs, Eastern Europe's Economics, ECON-
OMIST, Jan. 13, 1990, at 2. Lawrence Summers, Professor of Economics at Harvard University,
also advocates rapid reform and finds the situation in East Europe analogous to a situation in
which it is suggested that Britain reform its practice of driving on the left. But, finding the
switch to the right side a radical reform, Britain starts by only applying the new policy to
trucks. L. Summers, Address at Conference on Economic Transition in Eastern Europe, Brandeis
University (May 4, 1990) (available from Brandeis University). For an argument in favor of
gradual change, see Galbraith, Whkich Capitalism for Eastern Europe, HARPERS, Apr. 1990, at 19
(lecture delivered at the University of Edinburgh, January, 1990).
1990 / Recent Developments
states face being unable to compete against EC producers for customers
in an integrated EC. 49 But though they cannot afford to be shut out
of the unified market, few East European industries could at present
sustain open competition with the EC. The accords normalize relations
between the EC and the East European states, but they do not steer
a course between the Scylla of economic isolation and the Charybdis
of failure to compete. Consequently, the East European states need
association agreements more comprehensive than the current accords.
The EC also benefits from the association agreements, which show
solidarity with, and support for, the democratic movements in East
Europe.' 0 Many hope that democratic states in East Europe, particu-
larly if closely associated with the EC, will make Europe a safer place
than has been possible under the politics of opposing alliances."1
Economically, a closely associated East Europe presents rich opportu-
nities for the EC. East Europe provides EC capital with new cooper-
ative ventures and untapped investment possibilities and offers EC
producers new, and potentially enormous, markets. Both East Europe
and the EC will benefit from bilateral association "reflecting geographic
proximity, shared political, economic, and cultural values and in-
creased interdependence.' 52
The East European developments of 1988-89 presented the EC
with a single pressing problem: how to Westernize, modernize, and
integrate the East European command economies.1 3 In response, the
EC developed a preliminary strategy applicable to all East European
states.54 Recognizing that the time-consuming negotiation of highly
individualized accords is impracticable, the EC seems to have used
each general trade agreement as a model for the next. Moreover, the
EC gives every sign of negotiating basic second generation agreements
with equal speed. In responding quickly and practically to the East
49. These fears of being excluded from EC trade parallel those of EFTA. See sources cited
supra note 9.
50. Andriessen, supra note 45, at 1.
51. Failure of the Glorious Revolutions of 1989 and the resulting economic collapse could
cause immense human suffering and great political instability. More optimistically, successful
transformation of East European economies could make the European market even larger, with
a concommitant gain in prosperity for everyone. Possible profits, as well as the cost of failure,
counsel a strong commitment by the EC to the restructuring of the East European economies.
52. Andriessen, supra note 45, at 5.
53. The Western tendency to group the East European states is also based on geography,
over forty years of homegenous politics, and the recent fall of the Soviet-backed Communist
regimes, with the concurrent adoption of more liberal ideologies.
54. The EC advocates the use of aid, either outright or through debt rescheduling, to
ameliorate the hardship which will accompany transformation. The first steps of restructuring
are to be pricing reform (the end of subsidies) and currency convertibility. See Sachs, supra note
48, at 21. Nonetheless, there is increasing controversy about the order in which reforms are to
be carried out. J.M. Motias, Address at Conference on Economic Transition in Eastern Europe,
Brandeis University (May 4, 1990) (available from Brandeis University).
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European need, the EC has negotiated a series of trade agreements so
similar as to make few distinctions between the East European states.
The five East European states, committed in form to bilateral
agreement with the EC, have negotiated accords whose striking sim-
ilarities reveal the continued Western perception of an East European
bloc. Thus the Revolutions of 1989 have yielded a series of agreements
as important in their structure as in their content. When the East
European states exerted their commitment to self-determination and
rejected centralized economic control, they emerged to find a Europe
and perhaps a world with increasing collectivization of national inter-
ests. The EC has achieved a level of unity perhaps never seen in
modern Europe. 55 Despite their newly realized autonomy, the East
European states find themselves grouped together by their need for
immediate Western assistance. The EC alliances they consider the key
to Western markets have been achieved rapidly because of the Western
tendency to perceive a collective East European problem. In taking a
great leap toward nationalism, the East European states may have
committed themselves to supranationalism.
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55. Even staunchly autonomous EFTA states are voting, against tradition, for completely
free trade with the EC. See generally Bressand, Beyond Interdependence: 1992 ai a Global Challenge,
66 INT'L AFF. 47 (1990).
